Digital watermarking is a nascent but promising technology that oers protection of unencrypted digital content. This paper is a brief technical survey of the multimedia watermarking landscape. The three main technical challenges faced by w atermarking algorithms are delity, robustness and security. Current w atermarking methods oer possibly acceptable delity and robustness against certain types of processing, such as data compression and noise addition, but are not suciently robust against geometric transforms such as scaling and cropping of images. Theoretical approaches have been developed that could lead to secure watermarking methods, but substantial gaps remain between theory and practice.
Introduction
The merging of computation and communication, as embodied for example in the Internet, oers substantial new opportunities for processing and distribution of valuable digital creations such as audio tracks, still images, and movies. At the same time, the new technology oers cheap and easy copying and distribution of pirated material. A standard and well-understood technical approach to reducing piracy is to use cryptography: valuable material is distributed in encrypted form, and only authorized users have the decryption keys. A complementary approach that oers protection of unencrypted material is digital watermarking. This paper is a brief technical survey of the landscape of digital watermarking. Our goal is to understand the general principles that could lead to successful watermarking methods. Whereas cryptography is a relatively well-studied and stable eld, serious study of digital watermarking began only recently, and much is not yet known. We begin in Section 2 by describing what we mean by w atermarking, what content t ypes might be marked, and what functionality w atermarking might provide. In Section 3, we discuss what criteria should be used to evaluate watermarking methods, and why successful watermarking might e v en be possible. In Section 4, we discuss the components of a generic watermarking system. In Section 5, we study the issue of robustness of watermarks to standard data processing, and in Section 6 we discuss various issues concerning watermark security. In Section 7, we study theoretical results about the resistance of watermarks to attacks. In Section 8 we oer a few concluding remarks. Fo r a v ariety o f interesting papers on watermarking and related topics, see [1, 2 , 1 5 ].
What is Watermarking?
By watermarking we mean the embedding of encoded information into digital data so that the information is imperceptible, easily read by authorized parties only, and dicult to remove b y unauthorized parties without destroying the (value of the) original data. We contrast this with several related, but distinct notions:
Steganography (hidden writing): Steganography is the imperceptible embedding of encoded information in data in a way that may o r m a y not be robust, but with the assumption that a potential adversary is unaware of the existence of the hidden communication channel. Watermarking allows the possibility o f a n a d v ersary knowing about the channel; ideally, w e w ant methods resistant t o malicious attack.
Visible watermarking: Here the mark is designed to be easily read by all parties, but this visibility may (or may not) spoil the original data. Examples of visible image watermarks include the glyph technology of Xerox [13] and a method of IBM [23] .
Fragile watermarking: Here we e m bed information imperceptibly, but so that signicant c hanges to the data destroy the watermark. A fragile watermark can serve a s a n e m bedded signature guaranteeing the authenticity of the data. Ideally, a fragile watermark might e v en reveal, through how it has been distorted, what processing the original data has undergone. Developing fragile watermarking methods is a promising research direction, but it is beyond our scope here.
In watermarking, it is important to distinguish between two broad content t ypes. The rst, perceptual content, includes audio tracks (speech and wideband), still images, and video clips. The second, representational or abstract content, includes natural language texts and programs written in generalor special-purpose programming languages. From the standpoint o f w atermarking, the main distinction between these two content t ypes is the amount and kind of distortion each can tolerate. For perceptual content, it seems easier to make the distinction between \small" distortions of the data, as such those caused by a successful watermarking method, and \large," or value-destroying, distortions. Put dierently, in the case of perceptual content, we are dealing with a continuous space of possibilities that has some relatively simple (though high-dimensional) geometry. What the geometry might be for various kinds of representational content is largely unexplored terrain. Here we shall limit our attention to perceptual content, selecting our examples primarily from the realm of still images. Even for perceptual content, identifying the underlying geometry is a challenging problem.
The meaning of the watermark is another important issue. To understand the possible functions of watermarks, let us posit a simplied scenario in which a creator develops a piece of valuable content and sends it through a distribution channel, at the end of which it is released to various customers. The content can be marked in two places: by the creator, before it enters the distribution channel; and, by the distributor, as it leaves the channel. Marks introduced by the creator before distribution can depend only on the material itself, and not upon the recipient. Such w atermarks can encode creator identity, copyright information, and content c haracteristics. These marks can be used to help defend copyright, to identify the creator for advertising and billing purposes, and to identify the content for use in metering and to facilitate database search.
Marking the material as it is released to a consumer aords the possibility of putting consumer identication or transaction information into the content, so that illegitimately-distributed content can be traced back to its point of release. The added exibility allowed by transaction-based marking (sometimes called ngerprinting, although this word has also been used for other concepts) comes with some costs. First, the marking process must be ecient enough to not unduly impede the transaction. Preprocessing the content to make marking faster, or even pre-marking the content in many dierent w a ys and binding a specic mark to a specic consumer at transaction time, are ways to save time in transactions. Second, transactional marking raises the possibility of collusion attacks, in which pirates obtain several dierently marked copies of the same material and combine all the copies to remove all the dierent marks. Most of the theoretical work on watermarking has been devoted to the problem of resisting collusive attacks. We look at this in Section 7.
For more complicated (and more realistic) distribution chains, there are more opportunities to introduce and to use watermarks. Assuming that the watermarking method supports multiple marking, the entire development and distribution history of a piece of content could be encoded in a sequence of successively embedded marks.
Some have suggested that watermarks should be human-readable [7] . We believe strongly that watermarks should be machine-readable, not (necessarily) human-readable. Machine-readable marks allow the possibility of active marking, in which marks are read and appropriate actions are taken in the course of content processing and distribution. A very simple example is copy control: a video player/copier outtted with a watermark reader could seek a mark indicating "copyrighted material: no copying allowed," and disable the copying function when sensing such a mark. Another reason to use machine-readable marks is that they allow for much more ecient encoding of information into what is inherently a low-capacity communication channel.
Quality Criteria for Watermarking Methods
Critical criteria for watermarking methods include the following:
1. Fidelity: The changes entailed by marking should not aect the value of the content, and ideally the mark should be imperceptible. Specically, experts should not be able to discriminate between the watermarked data and the original.
2. Robustness: Watermarks should survive standard data processing, such a s w ould occur in a creation and distribution process. For still images, for example, such processing includes data compression, noisy transmission, digital-to-analog and analog-to-digital conversion (such as printing and scanning), color correction, sharpening and blurring, addition of captions, and geometric modications such as cropping, scaling and rotation.
3. Security: Watermarks should survive deliberate attempts to remove them. Ideally, a w atermark should remain readable up to the point where the content becomes modied enough to be of low value. A potential attacker can try standard processing techniques such as those mentioned above, but can also try less natural transformations specically designed to erase watermarks. Attack becomes easier if the attacker has access to a watermark reader and can measure success. Attack also becomes easier if the attacker has access to dierently marked versions of the same material.
Among these criteria, delity is usually paramount. The goal in building a successful marking method is to nd a way t o e m bed a mark with as much strength as possible (to provide robustness) while still preserving delity, b y k eeping the changes made by the mark under the perceptual threshold. We shall discuss this issue more fully in Section 5.
To obtain watermark security requires another key idea, that of randomness. The reason we might expect to be able to watermark perceptual data with some degree of security boils down to the following idea. Perceptual data has a very high number of places to put a mark (consider the number of pixels in a high-quality digital image.) The perceptual threshold allows small changes in a signicant but relatively small numb e r o f s u c h places. To spoil the mark successfully, an attacker who does not know the location of the mark must alter a large fraction of the places, thereby exceeding the perceptual threshold and destroying the original content. To guarantee that an attacker does not know the marked places, we can choose them randomly (or pseudo-randomly). This argument can be quantied, and (theoretically) gives security e v en in the presence of collusion. (See Section 7.)
Additional important criteria for watermarking methods include:
4. Data capacity: How many bits of information can the mark contain as a function of the size of the original content? How many marks can be added simultaneously?
5. Accuracy of detection: How accurately can the mark be read? What is the chance of a false positive (unmarked content appearing to have a mark) a false negative (marked data appearing to be unmarked), or a false reading (a mark misread as another mark)?
6. Eciency: What are the computing time, storage requirements, and software or hardware size of the mark writing and reading processes? Are they real-time, so that they can be incorporated into playback or display mechanisms in an on-line setting? How do they interact with data compression and decompression?
7. Data secrecy and storage requirements: What information needs to be retained, or kept secret, about the marks, their meaning, and the marked material? Depending upon the watermarking method, such information can include encryption and decryption keys for computing and interpreting marks, a database mapping marks to their meanings, and a database containing (components of) original content that has been marked. A signicant distinction here is between \original-based" watermarking methods, in which the original data is required to read the marks, and \no-original" methods, in which marks can be read without having the original. No-original algorithms are much more exible and useful but harder to make robust. Many of the early algorithms in the literature are original-based methods, which h a v e restricted practical functionality.
The Components of a Watermarking System
There are three components to a watermarking system: a watermark writing algorithm, a watermark reading algorithm, and a database (or databases) to store needed information about marks written and data that has been marked. We shall discuss watermark writing and reading from a generic point o f view. When specics or examples are needed to make concepts concrete, we shall select them from the domain of still images, although the same principles apply to watermarking audio tracks, video clips or similar kinds of data. Since database technology is relatively well-understood, we shall not comment o n this component o f a w atermarking system, except to mention information that might h a v e to be stored in such a database. The rst step in watermark writing is to choose a representation of the original data. An important property of media data is that it is high-dimensional: think of the number of pixels in a high-quality image. The representation may be the original representation (pixels for images); or it may be a transformed representation, such a s F ourier components, discrete cosine components, or wavelet components; or some higher-level representation, such as an object or feature representation. If a transformed representation is used, it may be applied to the entire data (the whole image), or on a block-by-block basis. For images, watermarks have been applied to pixels [3] , Fourier components [25] , whole-image and block-based discrete cosine components [8, 24, 39] , wavelet components [24] , and Fourier-Mellin components [26, 14] . One use of a transformed representation is to make the components of the data more independent; pixels in an image, for example, are highly correlated locally, which is not true of discrete cosine components.
Once a representation has been determined, a subset of the components must be chosen to be marked. This choice is generally made with the goal of preserving delity while enhancing robustness and security a s m uch as possible. One idea in the literature is to mark the largest-magnitude discrete cosine components [8] , the justication being that these components are perceptually signicant and likely to be preserved by common data processing techniques, such as data compression. Though this may b e a good approach for an original-based watermarking scheme, it may not be so useful for a no-original scheme, for reasons discussed below. For typical data, the largest magnitude components are mostly the low-frequency ones, and marking low frequencies may serve just as well. A possibly better idea for a nooriginal scheme is to mark mid-frequency components [14, 3 7 , 18] with the hope that these components are perceptually signicant but relatively low-energy. Herigal, et al. [14] for example, mark in the Fourier domain. They avoid \the largest (high energy) components (at about the lowest 10% of the frequencies)" and use \components at the medium frequencies (about next 30%)." They also suggest the possibility o f \marking the largest components (inside the allowed frequency range)."
Another guide to choosing components is to seek some that are invariant to certain kinds of processing. For example, one may c hoose to represent a color image using a luminosity-chrominance basis, and mark only the luminosity components, thereby rendering the watermark robust to a color-to-grayscale transformation. A similar idea discussed more fully in the next section is to mark certain Fourier-Mellin components of an image [26, 14] , thereby obtaining some robustness to the geometric transformations of scaling, cropping and rotation. To enhance security, one may c hoose to mark only a random subset of the set of components selected for robustness.
Having chosen components (places) to mark, one must choose the mark values and combine them with the chosen components to obtain modied components, which replace the original components and are used to construct a modied copy of the original data. The mark values may be an encoded and possibly encrypted representation of the information to be conveyed by the mark, or they may b e c hosen randomly and merely associated with the intended information (via a database entry). It is worth noting that encryption by itself will serve the purpose of making the watermark values appear random. A common choice of mark values is f0; 1g or f 1; +1g, although we shall see later that security needs dictate other choices. To deal with the issue of perceptibility, w e m a y c hoose to multiply each w atermark value by a strength parameter, which m a y be globally chosen or may depend on the particular component being marked and on the particular data being marked: sophisticated marking algorithms use perceptual masking models to choose strength parameters [39, 4 0 , 3 2 ] , seeking maximum-strength marks that lie within the perceptual threshold.
As a way of combining mark values with original component v alues, we distinguish between addition, in which each strengthened mark value is added to the corresponding original component v alue, and replacement, in which each strengthened mark value replaces the corresponding original component v alue. Other ways of combining values can generally be reduced to addition by an appropriate transformation. For example, a multiplicative marking scheme can be reduced to an additive marking scheme by applying a logarithmic transformation.
We can represent a generic additive w atermark-writing method symbolically as follows. Assume that n components of the data are to be marked, and that the original component v alues are The second major component o f a w atermarking system is the watermark reader, which of course must match the writer. To read a mark, we rst transform the data into the representation used for mark writing. Then we extract the components d 1 ; d 2 ; : : : ; d n that correspond to the ones that were marked. In a replacement-based scheme, these values should be approximately the strengthened mark values s 1 w 1 ; s 2 w 2 : : : ; s n w n . W e can merely divide each d i by the corresponding strength s i and attempt to interpret the resulting vector d 1 =s 1 ; d 2 =s 2 ; : : : ; d n =s n as a mark. One way t o m a k e the reading process robust is to use an error-correcting code in choosing marks and interpreting them. Another way is to apply signal detection theory [33] (see also [37, 1 9 , 18] ) and do a correlation-based hypothesis test. Namely, we compute a correlation (a dot product normalized in some way) between the hypothetical watermark d 1 =s 1 ; d 2 =s 2 ; : : : ; d n =s n and an actual watermark w 1 ; w 2 ; : : : ; w n , and conclude that the latter is present in the data if the correlation exceeds some threshold.
Virtually the same methods can be used to read additive w atermarks. The connection is tightest for original-based additive marking. If we h a v e access to the appropriate components, d 1 ; d 2 ; : : : ; d n of the original data, we can compute a hypothetical watermark by rst subtracting these components and then dividing by the strengths:
. W e can then apply error correction or a correlation test to the sequence w 1 ; w 2 ; : : : ; w n to attempt to match it against an actual mark. The CKLS original-based watermarking method [8] uses such a correlation test to read the mark.
Reading a no-original additive w atermark is more problematic. Fortunately, the correlation-based method still works if we merely correlate the reduced-strength components d 1 =s 1 ; d 2 =s 2 ; : : : d n =s n with an actual watermark w 1 ; w 2 ; : : : ; w n and apply a threshold test [37, 1 9 , 18] . A corresponding no-original version of the CKLS method is described in [31] . Such an approach w orks because the reduced-strength components A major hurdle in no-original watermarking is to reduce the noise in the detection process caused by the presence of the original data when doing watermark reading [37, 18] . One way to accomplish this is to mark low-energy but still signicant components, such as middle-frequency components as mentioned above. Subtracting out the original, when this is possible, can be viewed as just a very powerful noisereduction technique applied to standard correlation-based signal detection.
Robustness
As discussed briey in Section 3, to be robust, a watermark must survive t w o t ypes of standard processing techniques: alignment-preserving transformations, which include data compression, quantization, data conversion (digital-to-analog and analog-to-digital conversion), and others; and alignment-altering transformations, such as (in the case of images), cropping, scaling and rotation (Data conversion with severe distortion or imprecise resampling may actually be alignment-altering rather than alignmentpreserving.) The current state-of-the-art is that there are a variety of similar watermarking algorithms for various media types that survive alignment-preserving tranformations reasonably well. Many of these algorithms use frequency-based representations and rely on some kind of perceptual model to embed a maximum-strength imperceptible mark (e.g. [40] ).
Lacy, et al. [17] argue that compressed data, not the original baseband (raw or uncompressed) data, is what should be protected. They propose an audio watermarking algorithm that is tightly integrated with a perceptual audio data compressor. Such an algorithm allows reading a watermark from the compressed data, a capability that may be a requirement in on-line transaction-based systems. Whether such w atermarks survive decompression remains to be tested empirically.
Surviving alignment-altering transformations is problematic. For example, devising still-image watermarking methods that are robust to scaling, cropping and rotation is a challenging problem, especially for combinations of these transformations as would occur, for example, in creating a photomontage. Several approaches exist:
1. In an original-based method, one can align a transformed watermarked image against the original, using standard registration or pattern-matching methods.
2. In a no-original based method, one can add a universal registration mark and align a transformed marked image against the registration mark.
3. In a no-original method, one can attempt to do a self-alignment of a transformed image, based on some set of distinguishable features.
4. As mentioned in Section 3, one can put the watermark into a set of components that are invariant t o certain transformations. For still images the magnitudes of Fourier-Mellin components are invariant under translation, rotation, and scaling (in an abstract, continuous setting) [7, 36] O'Ruanaidh and Pun [26] h a v e explored Method 4, that of marking the magnitudes of the FourierMellin components, as a way to make w atermarks robust against translation, rotation and scaling. This idea has been rened by Herigal, et al. [14] . They rst take the logarithm of the luminance levels (to match the human visual system) and then do a Fourier transform. They mark the magnitudes of medium-frequency components. Additionally, they add a registration template based on a Fourier-Mellin transform of the magnitudes of the Fourier components. This template is intended to be robust against rotation and scaling. Their approach combines Methods 2 and 4. It is worth noting that taking the logarithm as the rst step has the eect of increasing the watermark signal-to-noise ratio and hence of making detection easier.
Security
Security o f w atermarks is receiving increasing attention, especially from the academic community. A v ariety of attacks on various kinds of watermarking schemes have been proposed and studied [27, 1 9 , 38, 16, 22, 11] . There are a variety of issues concerning watermark security that are properly in the domain of cryptography and cryptographic protocols, and these should be considered seperately from the issue of whether marks can be erased. For example, by using standard cryptographic methods, one can guarrantee (up to the security of the cryptographic scheme) that watermarks cannot be read or forged by unauthorized parties, although preventing false claims of ownership may require an appropriate information registry. Craven, et al. [11] observed that additive original-based schemes such as the CKLS algorithm [8] can be subjected to a forgery attack in which a forger creates his or her own watermark and subtracts it from a previously marked original, creating a fake \original" that the forger claims to own. Again, cryptographic techniques are the appropriate way to guard against attacks like this.
Turning to attacks designed to make w atermarks unreadable, it is well-known that a simple leastsignicant-bit scheme can be defeated by randomizing the least-signicant bits that contain the watermark, or by setting all these bits to zero. Schemes based on perceptual modeling that attempt to insert maximum-power watermarks are much harder to attack, but small amounts of scaling and cropping will erase many kinds of watermarks. For example, Kilian, et al. [21] observed that the CKLS mark can be rendered unreadable by cropping a few rows and columns of pixels and scaling the image to the original size. Such an attack can be countered by aligning (or registering) to the original image; or, if the original is not available, by aligning to a previously inserted registration mark, or by using a watermark that is robust to such transformations, as discussed in Section 5.
Making watermark writers and readers publically available creates security risks, even if the algorithms are black b o xes. For example, a watermark scheme that uses a universal, additive registration mark can be made unreadable by taking the negative of the marked data and remarking it, thereby subtracting out the registration mark (Bill Horne, oral communication, 1997). A scheme that uses a public reader may be susceptible to a sensitivity-analysis attack such as described by C o x and Linnartz [10] and analyzed by Linnartz and Van Dijk [19] . Fridrich, et al. [12] have proposed a watermarking method that uses key-dependent basis functions and may allow the construction of a secure public reader.
A particularly potent kind of attack i s a c ollusion attack, in which an attacker obtains several differently marked copies of the same data, or several dierent pieces of data marked in the same way.
Kilian, et al. [21] h a v e observed that correlative-reader watermarks that use a componentwise f 1; 1g or f0; 1g distribution (common in the literature) or even a component-wise uniform distribution are at risk of attack with as few as ve or six dierently-marked copies. Resistance to collusive attack is the main focus of the theoretical work we discuss in the next section.
7 Models of Security A b o d y o f w ork exists devoted to answering the question of whether truly secure watermarks can exist, and what the characteristics of such marks might be. Most of this work deals with resistance to collusive attacks. Such w ork is necessarily theoretical and relies on modeling assumptions. A key issue is the extent to which the emerging theories can be applied to practice.
An early and intriguing paper is that of Wagner [43] , who proposed the use of randomly selected additive w atermarks and did a preliminary study of the resistance of such marks to collusive attacks. Blakely, et al. [4] looked at a combinatorial model for collusion resistance, and proposed a scheme that oers k-way collusion resistance within the model but requires a numb e r o f w atermark bits exponential in the number of colluders. Chor, et al. [9] w orked on a related problem involving tracing pirates in a broadcast distribution system using a multiple-key protocol. Boneh and Shaw [ 5 ] combined the Chor, et al. work with a simple collusion-resistant s c heme to yield a watermarking method that provides defense against k-way collusion and conveys b bits of information in a watermark of size O(k 4 b) bits. Follow-on work to that of Chor, et al. and Boneh and Shaw appears in [29] , [30, 2 8 ] .
The Boneh-Shaw model is a discrete combinatorial framework that captures the notion of collusion resistance, but ignores other issues of watermark security and robustness. They posit a watermark consisting of n positions, each position selected from an alphabet of size s. An attacker in posession of k dierently watermarked copies is allowed to spoil any position in which t w o of the obtained copies dier. The goal of the watermarker is to identify at least one of the watermarks using only the information contained in the positions in which all k watermarks are the same.
Boneh and Shaw do not address the question of how to provide individual robust marking positions (which cannot be attacked unless detected by dierence analysis) nor do they consider the possibility that marked positions, even if detected, might be dicult to spoil (for perceptual or other reasons) This makes their method more suited for representational-content w atermarking (see Section 2) than for perceptual-content w atermarking.
A model of the latter kind of watermarking has been investigated by Kilian, et al. [21] , building on ideas of J. Kilian and F.T. Leighton (oral communications, 1996) and a draft set of notes of Leighton (1996) . The model assumes that the original data is an n-dimensional vector, with each component independently distributed according to N (0; 1), the Gaussian distribution with mean zero and variance 1. The model further assumes a perceptual threshold based on Euclidean distance. For an additive watermark that is also an n-dimensional vector with independent components distributed according to N (0; 1) (for a suitable choice of depending on the perceptual threshold) and a correlative original-based watermark reader, Kilian, et al. proved that the watermarks can carry O(n=k 2 ) bits of information while resisting k-way collusive attacks with high probability. Equivalently, O(k 2 b) w atermark components are needed to carry b bits of information while being secure against k-way collusive attack. Further work by Ergun, Kilian and Kumar (unpublished notes, 1997), rened and tightened by Mitchell, Tarjan and Zane (unpublished notes, 1997) has shown that, within the Kilian-Leighton statistical model, no watermarking method can oer better resistance to collusive attacks. Specically, collusive attack based on averaging and addition of Gaussian noise will erase any w atermark with high probability, given (n=k 2 ) dierently marked copies, if n is the dimension of the watermarks.
Related but independent w ork has been done by Karakos and Papamarcou [20] . They consider the ability of maximum-strength watermarks with original-based correlative reading to withstand the attack of averaging plus addition of Gaussian noise, within a Euclidean perceptual threshold model. They consider only a single-copy attack and a two-copy attack. They show that such w atermarks can convey up to 0:5 bits of information per dimension while being secure against a one-copy attack, and up to 0:146 bits per dimension while being secure against a two-copy attack.
One reason why no-original watermarking works, at least theoretically, is that in high dimensions randomly selected watermarks are, with high probability, almost orthogonal to the data and to each other [19, 37] . Tirkel et al. [42, 34, 35] discuss the issue of orthogonality at length, and propose the construction of watermarks that are exactly orthogonal to each other, but this may be an unecessary step in practice. (They use pseudo-random bit sequences as watermarks rather than Gaussian noise.) Swanson, et al. [41] suggest a scheme that chooses a random watermark direction and encodes a mark in the hidden direction, with a strength determined by a perceptual model. Some extensions of the Kilian, et al. results are possible. First, it is straightforward to extend the result to the no-original setting; only the constant factors change. Second, the watermark need not be Gaussian, but can be maximum-strength (or xed strength) with randomly chosen direction within the Euclidean threshold model, because, for high dimensions, Gaussian and random-direction xed-strength watermarks behave approximately the same. Thus the Swanson et al. marking algorithm falls within this theory.
Much remains to be done to extend this theoretical work and to determine if it has any practical relevance. The Kilian, et al. Euclidean perceptual model breaks down in reality because small geometric distortions can produce large changes in Euclidean distance. Also, a correlative reader must compute a correlation for each possible watermark, leading to a computation that is exponential in the number of bits of information conveyed. One way to improve the eciency of the reader is to use a small set of signalling patterns, either combined in all the components or distributed over subsets of components. A third direction to study is the relationship between the combinatorial and statistical models, and to determine whether they can usefully be combined. Finally, the Boneh-Shaw bound on watermark size is O(k 4 b) to protect against k colluders and convey b bits, but their lower bound is only (kb). Reducing the gap between these bounds is an open problem.
Remarks
Digital watermarking, though young, is a rapidly expanding eld. It combines elements of cryptography, signal processing, information theory, coding theory, probability and statistics, game theory and other disciplines. Whether all the activity in this area will lead to robust, practical watermarking schemes remains to be seen, but certainly the eld is full of exciting possibilities.
